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Law, market building and public health in the European Union 
Chris Holden and Ben Hawkins 
 
Abstract 
European Union (EU) law is based upon a liberalising imperative, the goal of which is to construct a 
single market between member states. Yet the EU is no ordinary trade pact, incorporating as it does 
a range of supranational political institutions and common policies in a range of areas beyond simple 
market building. Scholars have nevertheless noted a distinction ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ? ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ  ?ƚŚĞ
formulation of common policieƐ ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ Ăůů ŵĞŵďĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ? ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ
removal of national-level regulations acting as barriers to market integration). In the context of 
debates about the implications of trade law and corporate activity for health, this article poses three 
related questions. First, to what extent does EU law afford corporations opportunities to challenge 
national-level health regulations? Second, to what extent do EU legal and political processes provide 
opportunities for positive pro-health supranational regulation, including that which might offset the 
effects of negative liberalising integration? Third, how do EU market-building processes differ from 
those of more narrowly-drawn trade agreements and organisations in their implications for health? 
We analyse and compare two recent sets of health-related legal proceedings under EU law, the first 
of which challenges legislation passed by the Scottish Government to introduce minimum unit 
pricing for alcohol, and the second of which addresses the legĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ
2014 Tobacco Products Directive. We find, first, that EU law offers ample opportunities for 
corporations to challenge national health regulations; second, that there is significant scope for pro-
health supranational regulations, but that these must be couched in the language of facilitating the 
single market, and are dependent on the political commitment of key policy actors; and, third, that 
this (limited) scope for pro-health supranational regulation distinguishes EU legal and political 
processes from those of other trade agreements and organisations.  
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constitutionalisation; judicialisation; liberalisation; negative/positive integration. 
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Introduction 
The literature on trade and health has analysed the policy implications of a wide array of trade 
agreements and entities, including those of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and a number of 
plurilateral, regional and bilateral agreements (Friel et al., 2015). It has further analysed the 
opportunities that trade law affords transnational corporations (TNCs) to challenge national-level 
health regulations (Jarman, 2015). Many of the concerns raised about trade agreements, for 
example their implications for food hygiene standards, mirror debates which accompanied the 
construction of the European Union (EU) single-market. Yet the EU is different to more narrowly-
drawn trade entities in the extent of its political and legal development, which allows for some 
ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ŽĨ ƐƵƉƌĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů  ?ƌĞ ?ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ? dŚĞ h ?Ɛ
implications for health, while sharing some similarities, are therefore different to those purely trade- 
focussed agreements and organisations, such as the WTO, for which social concerns are peripheral. 
ƐĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚďĞůŽǁ ?ƚŚĞhĂůůŽǁƐĨŽƌďŽƚŚ ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?tŚŝůĞƚŚĞhƚŚƵƐ
offers opportunities for corporations to use single-market law to attempt to remove national-level 
health regulations which can be portrayed as barriers to internal trade, it also potentially permits, 
under certain conditions, the creation of pro-health EU-level regulation. Central to such 
considerations is the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
1
 in ruling on whether regulations at 
both the national and EU levels are compatible with EU law and the founding treaties on which the 
h ?ƐůĞŐĂůŽƌĚĞƌŝƐďĂƐĞĚ ?
In the context of debates about the implications of trade law for health, this article poses three 
related questions. First, to what extent does EU law afford corporations opportunities to challenge 
national-level health regulations? Second, to what extent do EU legal and political processes provide 
opportunities for pro-health supranational regulation, including that which might offset the effects 
of negative liberalising integration? Third, how do EU market-building processes differ from those of 
more narrowly drawn trade agreements and organisations in their implications for health? We 
attempt to answer these questions by analysing and comparing two recent sets of health-related 
legal proceedings brought under EU law. The first of these challenges legislation passed by the 
                                                          
1
 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) was renamed the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) with the 
ĞŶƚƌǇŝŶƚŽĨŽƌĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ>ŝƐďŽŶdƌĞĂƚǇŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?tĞƌĞĨĞƌŚĞƌĞƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞ: ?ǁŚĞŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐŝƚƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ
prior to the Lisbon Treaty and to  ‘ƚŚĞ:h ?ǁŚĞŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐŝƚƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĂƚƚƌĞĂƚǇ ?KƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ
ǁĞƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƵƌƚ ?ŽƌƐŝŵƉůǇƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ǁŚĞŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƚǇŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů ? 
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Scottish Government to introduce minimum unit pricing for alcohol; the second addresses the 
ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇŽĨƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞh ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?dŽďĂĐĐŽWƌŽĚƵĐƚƐŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?&ŝƌƐƚ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞ
some of the key similarities and differences between EU processes and those of narrower trade 
agreements, we discuss the development of EU law in relation to the single market and the 
protection of health, and the relationship of this to its political processes, particularly with reference 
to the concepts of negative and positive integration.  
 
The European Court and the EU integration process 
The EU incorporates a range of political, legal and economic institutions, which both bind its 
member states and facilitate their interaction. Less than a federation, but more than an 
intergovernmental organisation, it has been characterised as a complex system of multi-level 
governance (Marks et al., 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001). The European Court has been central to 
the EU integration process. Indeed, during its formative stages, the EU integration process was 
ŵĂƌŬĞĚďǇĂ ‘ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌǇ ?ƐƚĞŵŵŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨhƉŽůŝĐǇ
making on the one hand, and the supranational nature of EU law on the other (Scharpf, 1996: 15; 
see also Weiler, 1981; Scharpf, 2002). Although intergovernmentalism in EU law making has since 
been superseded to a significant degree by the process of co-decision between the European 
WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ  ?W ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽƵŶĐŝů ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ  ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽƵŶĐŝů ? ?2 (acting on proposals put 
forward by the European Commission), the opportunities for veto (Tsebelis, 2002; Holden and 
Hawkins, 2016) within the EU political system continue to make the creation of new supranational 
regulation more difficult than the removal of existing national-level regulations. EU legal processes, 
by contrast, have resulted in a powerful body of supranational law (based on the treaties) which is 
interpreted by the European Court and which binds its member states. Nevertheless, as will be 
elaborated below, such legal systems proceed not merely on the basis of obvious or neutral 
technical principles, but must be analysed in the context of broader political processes (Burley and 
Mattli, 1993: 44).  
ŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞŵĂĚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞhƐǇƐƚĞŵ
(Scharpf, 1996). The distinction relates to the treatment of regulation in the attempt to remove 
regulatory differences between countries, which can act as barriers to the free movement of goods, 
                                                          
2
 The Council of the European Union is composed of ministers from relevant deparƚŵĞŶƚƐŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?
governments (depending upon the policy area being discussed) meeting in a legislative capacity. Until the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the Council of the European Union was referred to as the Council 
of Ministers.  
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services, people and capital on which the single market is founded. Positive integration refers to 
efforts to formulate common policies and standards that apply to all member states, whereas 
negative integration aims to remove barriers to integration and common action that arise from 
national regulations (Anderson, 2015: 4). The difference between positive and negative integration 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŝŶŐůĞ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ŝƐ ůŝŶŬĞĚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŚĂƌŵŽŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽŶĞ ŚĂŶĚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŵƵƚƵĂů
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŐŽŽĚƐŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?dŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƵƐƵĂůůǇƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞǀŝĂƚŚĞĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶ
of a common EU standard on a particular product or good. The latter, in contrast, allows goods 
legally produced in one member state to be sold in all others, thereby removing impediments to 
trade that arise from different regulatory regimes. The European Court is a key site of negative 
integration, deepening economic integration via a series of rulings based on a broad interpretation 
of EU primary (i.e. treaty) and secondary (e.g. directives and regulations) law. A key feature of this 
process is the way in which it allows private actors wide scope to litigate via national courts.  
 
Constitutionalisation, negative integration and corporate activity 
To be effective, processes of trade liberalisation require a system that enables the monitoring and 
enforcement of agreements between parties. Without this, the incentive for parties to gain 
advantage by ignoring their obligations to open markets while others obey them will threaten to 
undermine the system (Stone Sweet, 2004: 8). Crucially, this must involve some form of third-party 
dispute resolution, i.e. an arbitration mechanism or a court. For these reasons, the formation of the 
WTO led to a significant strengthening of the dispute resolution system compared to its forerunner 
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In the EU, the European Court plays this role. 
The Court, however, is more than simply an arbitration mechanism. Scholars have noted how, 
through successive rulings over time, it has come to operate as the constitutional court for the EU 
(Stone-Sweet, 2004). However, in contrast to most national-level constitutions, the treaties that 
ĨŽƌŵƚŚĞh ?Ɛ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞďǇƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ŚĂǀĞƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝƐĞĚŵĂƌŬĞƚ
building over market  ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?^ĐŚĂƌƉĨ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?Indeed, Stone Sweet (2004: 15) argues that a 
key motivation for litigating under EU law is for transnational economic actors to seek the removal 
ŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚŚŝŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚ ‘ƚŽĨŝǆŵĂƌŬĞƚƌƵůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĨĂǀŽƵƌ ? ? 
Certain ECJ decisions in the 1960s on the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy represent key 
ŵŽŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ŽĨ ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ĂůůŽǁs natural 
(citizens) and legal (corporations) persons to plead rights enshrined in EU law in national courts. The 
direct effect doctrine thus gradually constructed a set of individual rights from a body of law initially 
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intended to apply only to states (Burley and Mattli, 1993: 60). The doctrine of supremacy specifies 
that, where national law comes into conflict with EU law, the latter has primacy (Stone Sweet, 2004: 
68). This compels national courts to resolve contradictions between national and EC law by deferring 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ  ?^ƚŽŶĞ ^ǁĞĞƚ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? Ɛ ^ĐŚĂƌƉĨ  ? ? ? ? ? P  ?  ŶŽƚĞƐ ?  ‘[o]nce the direct effect and 
supremacy of European law was accepted, the Commission and the Court of Justice had the 
opportunity to continuously expand the scope of negative integration without involving the Council 
ŽĨDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ? ?
^ƚŽŶĞ^ǁĞĞƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘[t]he constitutionalisation process has been driven primarily by 
ƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůŝƚŝŐĂŶƚƐ ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůũƵĚŐĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ: ? ?ĂƐǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŐƌŽƵƉƐďƌŝŶŐĐĂƐĞƐ
in an attempt to secure their rights and advance their interests via EU law. As Conant (2007: 58 W60) 
notes, the literature on the Court demonstrates that greater organisational capacity, the ability to 
track official developments, and access to funds mean that powerful interests are most able to 
exploit litigation opportunities. According to Stone Sweet (2004: 74), as TNCs target national 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ ŝŵƉĞĚĞƚŚĞŝƌ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇƐƚĂƚĞĐĂŶ  W potentially at least  W be peeled 
ĂǁĂǇ ? ůŝŬĞ ůĂǇĞƌƐ ĨƌŽŵ ĂŶ ŽŶŝŽŶ ? ? ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ďǇ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚĞƌ  ? ? ? ?Ɛ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ŚĂĚ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ
adjudication in the area of free movement of goods had exposed to challenge virtually any national 
rule that might affect intra-ƚƌĂĚĞ ? ?
 
Proportionality testing 
Provisions on the free movement of goods have influenced the relationship between EU law and the 
regulatory autonomy of member states more than any other area of EU activity. Important in the 
Treaty of Rome and in this body of jurisprudence is the prohibition of regulatory measures having an 
effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on trade. In the Dassonville case (ECJ 8/74 [1974] ECR 
 ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?Ă ?ůůƚƌĂĚŝŶŐƌƵůĞƐĞŶĂĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞDĞŵďĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨ
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered 
ĂƐ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ĂŶ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ?ĐŝƚĞĚ ŝŶ ^ƚŽŶĞ ^ǁĞĞƚ ?  ? ? ? ? P
123). 
As in other forms of trade arbitration, European Court judges refer to the principle of 
 ‘ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? when deciding what exceptions to single-market principles are permissible. In the 
context of the single market, and similar to WTO and other trade agreements, this entails a 
consideration of whether the same policy aim could have been attained by a measure less restrictive 
of trade. The grounds on which exceptions to the principle of free movement could be justified were 
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explicitly set out in Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome (now Article 36 TFEU), but must meet specific 
criteria in order to be allowed. Thus, while regulation in the public interest was permissible, it would 
be subject to tests of proportionality and must not constitute a disguised restriction on trade. The 
ECJ asserted this proportionately test in the De Peijper case (ECJ 104/75 [1976] ECR 613), stating that 
 ‘ ?Ŷ ?ĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌƵůĞƐŽƌƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĚŽŶŽƚĨĂůůǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚŝŶƌƚ ? ? ?ŝĨƚŚĞŚĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚůŝĨĞ
of humans can be as effectively protected by measures which do not restrict intra-community trade 
ƐŽŵƵĐŚ ? ?ĐŝƚĞĚŝŶ^ƚŽŶĞ^ǁĞĞƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?/ŶƚŚĞCassis de Dijon ruling (ECJ 120/78 [1979] ECR 649), 
the ECJ established that even national measures that did not formally discriminate between 
domestic and foreign products, but that had a protectionist effect, were contrary to EC law unless 
they met tests of proportionality.
3
  
Stone Sweet (2004) notes how, in the process of negative integration, traders began by targeting the 
most obvious barriers to free movement, but that to the degree that these were removed by the 
Court, they then went on to target an ever-broader range of regulations. By the end of the 1980s, 
therefore, national rules on marketing rather than trading or production  W including those with 
particular importance for health, such as on minimum pricing, labelling and packaging requirements 
 W were being contested under EU law (Stone Sweet, 2004: 132). Collectively, these cases helped to 
create a framework, based on legal precedent, for dealing with public health exceptions (Stone 
Sweet, 2004: 133). 
 
Health in the EU Treaties 
When in the 1980s EU member states acted to deepen European integration via new treaties, they 
did so primarily on the basis of provisions aimed at deepening market integration (Anderson, 2015: 
29). A shift towards a more pro-market consensus in member states led them towards the further 
development of the internal market project via, initially, the Single European Act (SEA), which 
entered into force in 1987. However, Alter (2009: 155) argues that they did this not on the basis only 
ŽĨ ŵƵƚƵĂů ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ŽŶ Ă ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚ ŚĂƌŵŽŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
ǁŚĞƌĞďǇŵƵƚƵĂůƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂƉƉůŝĞĚ  ‘ŽŶƚŽƉŽĨĂďĂƐĞŽĨŚĂƌŵŽŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŽĂƐƚŽŵŝŶŝŵŝƐĞ ŝƚƐ
deregulatory effecƚƐ ? ?
                                                          
3
 Limitations were later placed upon the scope of EC law in this area by the Keck case (ECJ C-267 and C-268/91 
[1993] ECR I-4879). A summary of this jurisprudence, which is too elaborate to outline here, can be found in 
Stone Sweet, 2004: 139 W144. See also Alter (2009) for an analysis of the role of the Cassis de Dijon ruling in 
providing the basis for the European Commission to press ahead with an agenda of mutual recognition of 
national regulations.  
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This had some important, though limited, implications for public health. The SEA for the first time 
recognised health as an important dimension of economic integration (Duina and Kurzer, 2004: 58), 
although it was not until the Treaty on European Union (TEU; commonly known as the Maastricht 
Treaty) entered into force in 1993 that the EU acquired explicit competence in the field of public 
health (McKee et al., 2010: 235 W36). Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
1999, the EU was ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽ ‘ĞŶƐƵƌĞĂŚŝŐŚůĞǀĞůŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŚĞĂůƚŚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĂůůŝƚƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĂŶĚ
activities (Article 152(1) TEC [now Article 168 TFEU], as cited in McKee et al., 2010: 236). Despite the 
ŵŽǀĞ ƚŽ  ‘ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ŚĞĂůƚŚ ŝŶ Ăůů h ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ? d makes clear that the main 
responsibility for public health remains with the member states, with EU-level action aimed at 
ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚŝƐ ? dŚĞ dƌĞĂƚǇ ŽĨ >ŝƐďŽŶ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĞŶƚĞƌĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ĨŽƌĐĞ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ?  ‘ƌĞŝƚĞƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ
obligation on the EU to take into account  “ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? ŝŶ ĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ
ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐŝƚƐŽƚŚĞƌƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ?DĐ<ĞĞĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? P    ? ?
The EU treaties thus provide a limited foundation for health-protective legislation at the EU level and 
Ă ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ƚŽƉƌŽƚect the health of their citizens at the national level, 
while simultaneously providing extensive scope for corporations to challenge regulations in court. 
Below we investigate these issues further by examining two recent sets of legal proceedings before 
thĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ŽƵƌƚ ? dŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ Ă ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ Đ^ŽƚƚŝƐŚ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĞŶĂĐƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ
measures to set a minimum unit price (MUP) for alcohol, while the second involves a challenge to 
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞh ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?dŽďĂĐĐŽWƌŽĚƵĐƚƐŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?dW ? ?In order to explore the questions 
set out above, we take a comparative case study approach drawing upon relevant legal documents 
and other literature, examining first a case of the attempted overturn of (sub)national legislation 
and, second, a challenge to EU-level regulations.  
We do this by analysing relevant legal documents and other texts. Literature searches were 
undertaken using Google Scholar and Web of Science databases in relation to the TPD and MUP 
cases to identify sources on the origins and development of the relevant legislation and legal cases. 
A snowballing approach was then applied to studies returned in searches, as well as those known to 
the authors from their previous work in these areas, to identify additional sources. Relevant 
commentaries on contemporary events in the media and academic blogs were also consulted. 
WƌŝŵĂƌǇůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞh ?ƐĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĞĂƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ
of the CJEU, were examined to identify the relevant legal basis of the legislation discussed and the 
points of contention in the subsequent litigation. Although the two legal cases are the focus of the 
analysis, we took a political science approach throughout, rather than conducting a narrowly legal 
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analysis, attempting to understand the intersection of legal and political processes in producing 
policy outcomes. 
 
Minimum unit pricing and alcohol industry litigation 
The EU has regarded alcohol regulation primarily as a national responsibility, with EU-level initiatives 
taking the form not of harmonisation but of coordination, via the EU Alcohol Strategy for the period 
2006 W2012 (EC, 2006; Holden and Hawkins, 2016). The expiry of the alcohol strategy, and the failure 
to renew it after 2012, reflect the relatively weak political priority given to alcohol policy. Attempts 
to mandate health-oriented labelling of alcohol products via harmonisation measures were dropped 
as a result of industry lobbying  ?ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ĨŽƌ  ‘ĂůĐŽƉŽƉƐ ? ?(Kurzer, 2013: 163; Cisneros Ornberg, 
2013: 175). Simultaneously, measures implemented by member states have been challenged by 
alcohol corporations for breeching single-market rules. Baumberg and Anderson (2008: 394) 
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ  ‘ũƵƌŝĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĂůĐŽŚŽůƉŽůŝĐǇŚĂƐ ƚĂŬĞŶƉůĂĐĞ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ being 
 ‘ƌĞ-ĨƌĂŵĞĚ ?ĨƌŽŵŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇƚo competition policy.  
Minimum pricing policies have been ruled by the European Court to be trade distorting and to 
constitute measures having equivalent effects to quantitative restrictions (Baumberg and Anderson, 
2008: 393). Minimum pricing policies for tobacco offer a precedent for the alcohol minimum pricing 
case considered here. Such measures have been ruled by the Court as unacceptable on the basis 
that increased taxation could achieve the same goals (Baumberg and Anderson, 2008: 395 W96; 
McKee et al., 2010: 275). The CJEU (2010) found that minimum pricing of tobacco contravened 
Directive 95/99 (pertaining to excise levels of tobacco) in that it removed the potential for imported 
products to compete on price with established products. The Court also held that the imposition of a 
minimum price went against the specific stipulation, in Article 9(1) of the directive, that 
manufacturers and importers retain the ability to set the maximum retail price of their products. 
Increases in taxation, it stated, would not contravene single-market laws.  
dŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞDhWĨŽƌĂůĐŽŚŽůŝŶ ? ? ? ?ǁas an attempt to use the 
specific and circumscribed powers devolved to it under the Scotland Act (1998) to respond to the 
very high rates of alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harm in Scotland, which are far in excess 
of the UK average (Scottish Government, 2008). It is impossible to understand the dynamics of the 
MUP debate without placing it in the constitutional and political context of post-devolution Scotland 
(Holden and Hawkins, 2013). Constitutionally, while taxation remained Ă  ‘ƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ? ?
decided exclusively by the UK Government in Westminster, health matters were devolved to the 
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Scottish Government. This removed the possibility for Scottish ministers to use increases in Duty and 
VAT levied on alcoholic beverages to address the issue of harms driven by the wide availability of 
cheap alcohol (Katikireddi et al, 2014). It was also argued by public health campaigners that MUP 
would be more effective in addressing alcohol-related harms than taxed-based measures, especially 
among the most harmful drinkers (SHAAP 2010). In terms of politics, the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) became the largest party in the Scottish Parliament for the first time in 2007, forming a 
minority government having committed to address health inequalities through a radical 
reorientation of Scottish alcohol policy. Having failed to pass legislation on MUP as a minority 
government in 2010, the SNP again committed to the policy in its 2011 manifesto and won a clear 
majority of seats at the subsequent Scottish elections. In May 2012, the Scottish Parliament passed 
the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act to bring MUP into law (Holden and Hawkins 2013). A 
subsequent order set the level of MUP at 50p. 
dŚĞ^EW ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞDhW represented a definitive shift in UK alcohol policy away 
from ineffective, industry-favoured approaches (Hawkins and Holden, 2013) towards effective 
whole-population measures, such as price increases (Babor et al., 2010). Having failed to stop the 
legislation being enacted, the alcohol industry sought to stymie implementation and overturn the 
law through legal challenges. The Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) announced on 19 July 2012 that 
it had begun proceedings under both UK and EU law. It was joined in its action by EU-level alcohol 
industry associations Confédération Européenne des Producteurs de Spiritueux (Spirits Europe) and 
the Comité Européen des Entreprises Vins (The European Committee of Wine Businesses, CEEV).  
Its case centred on the claim that the Scottish Government, in enacting MUP, had overstretched its 
legal competence under both the terms of the Acts of Union (1707) and the Scotland Act (1998). 
Furthermore, it claimed the policy infringed Article 34 (TFEU) prohibiting quantitative restrictions on 
the movement of goods between member states and measures having equivalent effect, and that no 
exemption could be justified under Article 36 TFEU (previously Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome). As 
discussed above, the latter allows governments to put in place trade-restrictive measures where 
ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌ ‘ƚŚĞƉrotection of health and life oĨŚƵŵĂŶƐ ? ?ƐŽůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞƐĞĚŽŶŽƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ
indirect attempts at protectionism. Health exemptions are permissible where similar effects cannot 
be brought about by less trade-distorting measures. On 3 May 2013, Judge Lord Doherty, rejected 
the půĂŝŶƚŝĨĨ ?Ɛ ĐĂƐĞ ? ƌƵůŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐƚǁĂƐ ŶŽƚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŵƉĞƚence of the Scottish 
Parliament, and that the proposed Order to set a minimum price was within devolved competence 
and the powers of the Scottish Ministers. Furthermore, he concluded that the proposed measures 
were compatible with EU law, and that a further referral to the CJEU on the matter was unnecessary. 
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The SWA appealed the decision to the Inner House of the Court of Session (i.e. the court of appeal in 
Scotland) and, in April 2014, the Lord Justice Eassie referred the case to the CJEU to provide its 
opinion on the compatibility of MUP with EU law. On 3 September 2015 CJEU Advocate General, 
Yves Bot, published his opinion on the case. This reaffirmed that MUP did constitute a measure 
having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions, since it removed the ability of exporters to 
benefit from the comparative advantage they may have through lower cost bases and thus to 
compete with domestic producers on price. However, he accepted that measures such as MUP may 
be effective in reducing alcohol-related health harms and thus could be justified under Article 36 if it 
could be demonstrated that equivalent outcomes could not be brought about through less trade-
restrictive measures such as taxation (Advocate General, 2015). 
The tenor of the opinion seemed to favour tax-based measures over MUP, mirroring arguments 
brought forward by the alcohol industry. Taxation, the Advocate General argued, maintained the 
 ‘ĨƌĞĞ ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉƌŝĐĞ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? ĂŶĚcould, potentially, be more effective in achieving the 
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ?Ɛ stated goals by combatting alcohol misuse across the spectrum, not simply targeting those 
drinking at the cheapest end of the market. This seemed to undermine the Scottish Government ?Ɛ 
claims that MUP represented a uniquely effective approach.  
The Advocate General ?ƐKƉŝŶŝŽŶ, was widely reflected in the final judgement of the CJEU delivered 
on 23 December 2015. However, the CJEU reiterated the responsibility of courts in the member 
state to determine the necessity of MUP in light of other available measures, such as increased 
taxation, which might be less restrictive of trade (CJEU, 2015). In October 2016, the Court of Session 
ruled, in light of the CJEU opinion, that MUP was indeed legal on the grounds that no other measure 
would produce the same effect as MUP. In delivering their judgment, Lord Carloway, Lord Brodie 
and Lord Menzies ŚĞůĚƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƉƌŽblem with an increase in tax is simply that it does 
ŶŽƚ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ Ă ŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ ƉƌŝĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚat retailers such as supermarkets could absorb any tax 
increases  “by off-setting them against the price of other products unrelĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĂůĐŽŚŽů ?  ?ŽƵƌƚ ŽĨ
Session, 2016). 
The judgement of the CJEU thus struck a careful balance. While clearly preferring taxation to MUP as 
ĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƐŐŽĂůƐ ?the European judges gave the Court of Session sufficient 
latitude to find in favour of MUP. In its judgement, the CJEU recognised that member states remain 
sovereign in questions of public health in line with the principle of subsidiarity and that Scottish 
ministers, under the terms of devolution, are competent to enact measures such as MUP for the 
purpose of health protections (Andreangeli, 2016). The CJEU, however, was silent on the specific 
policy options available to the Scottish Government within the UK ?ƐĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ. This is 
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unsurprising, given that such internal constitutional matters are regarded as being for member 
states to determine. In line with CJEU practice, it was ultimately for the Court of Session to 
determine whether MUP was more effective than taxation. For its part, the Court of Session found in 
favour of MUP not because it was the only measure open to the Scottish Government, but because 
it was the most effective. It nevertheless noted that the decision not to consider the precise 
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁĂƐ “ĂĐƵƌŝŽƵƐĂŶŽŵĂůǇŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĂůĞŐĂů
argument that increasing tax is a viable alternative, when the political reality is that it ŝƐĐůĞĂƌůǇŶŽƚ ? 
(Court of Session, 2016), i.e., ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞh< ?ƐƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĚƵƚǇĂŶĚsd
are set at Westminster, the Scottish government was unable to use the option of increasing tax. The 
complex multi-level machinery of EU governance thus produced an anomaly, which the European 
Court did not explicitly take into account, but which it was able to work around by referring the case 
back to the relevant member-state court. This outcome is perhaps consistent with the arguments of 
those, like Stone Sweet (2004), who have argued that the European Court is aware of the political 
implications of its decisions and takes these into account ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǌŽŶĞŽĨĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂǁ
affords it. The decision was appealed to the UK Supreme Court by the SWA and, at the time of 
writing, we await the very final ruling in the case. 
 
The 2014 Tobacco Products Directive and tobacco industry litigation  
Since the 1990s the European Commission has been active in the area of tobacco control, and in 
contrast to alcohol policy it has steered through a series of directives related to labelling, product 
regulation, advertising and sponsorship, and taxation (see McKee et al., 2010: 259 W60). Given the 
limited competence of the EU in the area of health, all these directives, other than those on 
taxation, were based on treaty provisions relating to the internal market (McKee et al., 2010: 262). 
These directives have been subject to legal challenge by the tobacco industry and sympathetic 
member states. However, with some notable exceptions, the European Court has found in favour of 
the Commission, upholding health promotion measures (see McKee et al., 2010, for a 
comprehensive summary).  
Particularly significant is the Tobacco Advertising Directive (TAD) (98/43/EC), which was adopted 
almost 10 years after its initial proposal by the Commission, following significant opposition by the 
tobacco industry (Neuman et al., 2002). It sought a complete ban on the marketing of tobacco 
products across all media (e.g. in print, on television, in cinemas) and at the point of sale and 
consumption (e.g. branded ashtrays, parasols and other items). The legal basis of the TAD was 
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Article 100a TEC (subsequently Article 95 TEC; now Article 114 TFEU),
4
 pertaining to measures 
necessary to ensure the functioning of the single market. Paragraph 3 of the Article also requires the 
Commission, in considering new proposals, to  ‘ƚĂŬĞĂƐĂďĂƐĞĂŚŝŐŚůĞǀĞůŽĨƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽ
consumer health. The Directive was challenged by the German government and four tobacco 
companies on the grounds that it was public health legislation and thus ultra vires (i.e. exceeded the 
stated legal basis in the treaties) (Boessen and Maarse, 2008). The ECJ annulled the Directive in 
October 2000, ruling that measures within the Directive (e.g. the ban on cinema advertising) did not 
have the effect of facilitating cross-border trade or competition (Mandal et al., 2009; Hervey, 2001). 
An amended Directive, focusing explicitly on cross-border advertising (i.e. television and magazines) 
was enacted in 2003, despite similar legal challenges (Boessen and Maarse, 2008).  
These cases highlight the importance of the legal basis of EU legislation and the principles of 
proportionality (that legislation should not go beyond what is necessary for the achievement of 
treaty objectives) and subsidiarity (that the EU shall act  ‘only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States ?) (Mandal et al., 2009). They 
also demonstrate the inclination of the judges to privilege these principles over the objective of 
securing public health. However, they established that legislation correctly adopted under the single 
market rules, for the intended market-oriented purpose of those articles, can have the (secondary) 
effect of harmonizing health policies (Boessen and Maarse, 2008). Thus, they created a clear 
precedent for the adoption of additional single market legislation which furthered public health 
objectives.  
The first Tobacco Products Directive (2001/37/EC) was enacted in 2001 following extensive 
opposition from industry and certain member-states (McKee et al., 2010). dŚĞdW ?Ɛ main provisions 
related to the maximum tar yields, labelling, ingredients disclosure and the banning of misleading 
descriptors (i.e.  ‘ůŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘mild ?) and a ban on the sale of snus outside of Sweden (Mandal et al., 
2009). The TPD was subject to legal challenges by the tobacco industry citing the annulment of the 
TAD (Mandal et al., 2009). They questioned the legal basis of the TPD under Article 95 TEC (formerly 
Article 100a TEC; now Article 114 TFEU), arguing that the proposed legislation did not serve the 
objectives of the single market but instead pursued overtly public health objectives, and citing the 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. The descriptors ban and increased labelling 
requirements were also claimed ƚŽŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐ ?ƚƌĂĚĞŵĂƌŬĂŶd intellectual property rights. In 
                                                          
4
 Some treaty articles were renumbered following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty on 1 May 1999 
and again following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. The Lisbon Treaty also 
changed the name of the Treaty Establishing a European Community (TEC) to the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU). 
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its 2002 ruling the ECJ found the Directive to be valid, reinforcing the precedent that measures with 
significant public health impacts could be enacted under single- market legislation if they are strictly 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market.   
The second, revised, TPD (2014/40/EU) entered into force on 19 May 2014, following a long and 
highly controversial legislative process and an unprecedented lobbying campaign by the tobacco 
industry (Peeters et al., 2015; Hoerz, 2014). The TPD contained a range of measures on the content, 
labelling and packaging of tobacco products and sought to put in place a regulatory framework for 
electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes). Most notably it included mandatory increases in the size of 
health warning labels and an explicit recognition that member states could unilaterally introduce 
standardised  ? ‘ƉůĂŝŶ ? ?packaging at the national level. The specific legal basis was again Article 114 
TFEU (formally Article 95 TEC; formerly Article 100a TEC). The rationale for adopting the TPD centred 
on the potential barriers to the functioning of the single market which arose from the diverging 
regulatory regimes which had emerged since the adoption of the last TPD in 2001. In particular, 
differences in labelling requirements, for example with some member states requiring graphic 
warning labels while others do not, was seen as a disruption to the market.  
Two transnational tobacco companies, Philip Morris International (PMI) and British American 
Tobacco (BAT) with support from other industry actors, launched a legal challenge to the Directive 
via the High Court in London, arguing that, in enacting the Directive and delegating such wide-
reaching regulatory powers to the Commission, the EU had acted beyond its legal competence, 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂǀĞŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ŽĨ ƐƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞĚ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ?Ɛ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ƚŽ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚ
information. More specifically, they questioned whether Article 114 (TFEU) provides a sufficient legal 
basis for several of the measures contained within the Directive, including the prohibition of 
flavourings, labelling requirements and the provision enabling member states to enact standardised 
packaging, and whether these measures contravened the principle of proportionality contained 
within the treaties (PMI, 2014).On 3 November 2014, the High Court referred the case to the CJEU 
for a preliminary ruling. Following submission to the Court from interested parties on 23 December, 
Advocate General Kokott delivered her preliminary ruling on the case in which she summarily 
dismissed the ƉůĂŝŶƚŝĨĨƐ ? claims. The position of the Advocate General was upheld in the final ruling 
of the CJEU delivered on 4 May 2016. The Court held that all aspects of the TPD were both within 
the competence of the EU and proportionate for achieving the stated aims of the Directive. After 
this potential legal impediment had been cleared the TPD came into effect on 20 May 2016 as 
stipulated in the Directive, although transitional arrangements were set out for some measures.  
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Discussion 
The centrality of the EU single market within the European integration project is clearly evident in 
the area of public health. In the case of alcohol, and of minimum pricing more broadly, the potential 
for corporations to use EU law to challenge national-level regulation is clear, despite the CJEU ?Ɛ
nuanced judgement on the MUP case. Even in the case of tobacco control, where the Commission 
has played an agenda-setting role, the market-building foundations of the EU treaties take 
precedence over health objectives. Given the ambiguity and limited scope of the treaty provisions 
on public health, a series of EU tobacco directives have been based on single-market provisions in 
the treaties, since they deal with harmonisation of rules concerning product packaging and 
marketing (Anderson, 2015: 175). This has opened them up to legal challenge on the grounds that 
they violate those same market principles, or that their objectives lie outside the legal remit of the 
treaty articles on which they are based. As McKee et al.  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ŶŽƚĞ ? ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ 
ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ƌƵůŝŶŐƐ ŽŶ ƚŽďĂĐĐŽ ĂĚǀĞƌƚŝƐŝŶŐ  ‘ŵĂŬĞ ŝƚ ĐůĞĂƌ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ h ŵĂǇ ŶŽƚ ůĂǁĨƵůůǇ ƵƐĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů
ŵĂƌŬĞƚůĂǁƐŝŵƉůǇƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚŐŽĂůƐ ?, although they do acknowledge that single-market 
legislation can have the secondary effect of harmonising health policies. The market-building focus 
of EU law thus affords corporations ample opportunities to challenge both national-level health 
regulations and EU-level regulations, given that the latter must be based on single-market law.  
EŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ĚŽĞƐ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ complex legislative machinery provide multiple opportunities for policy 
influence by corporations, ĂŶĚ  ‘ǀĞƚŽ ƉŽŝŶƚƐ ? Ăƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ůĂǁƐ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ƐƚǇŵŝĞĚ  ?,ŽůĚĞŶ ĂŶĚ ,ĂǁŬŝŶƐ ?
2016), corporations are able to challenge EU-level, national and sub-national legislation directly on 
ƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨhůĂǁ ?dŚĞh ?ƐŚŝŐŚůǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚůĞŐĂůŽƌĚĞƌƚŚƵƐ
offers a powerful mechanism through which corporations may seek to challenge public health 
measures that run counter to their interests. Furthermore, the robust legal basis in the treaties and 
the existential importance of the single market to the European integration project mean that there 
is a strong bias towards trade facilitation in the jurisprudence of the Court, which may be seen as 
being undermined by health and social policies that seek to curtail health-harming industries. 
Despite commitments to guaranteeing  ‘health in all policies, ? therefore, the limited explicit 
competence of the EU in health policy has important consequences. First, it means that health-
relevant harmonisation across the EU must be justified in terms of single-market rules. Second, it 
means that national-level health regulations must be constructed in the least trade-restrictive way 
possible and may be struck down by the Court if deemed inconsistent with this principle.  
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There is a clear difference, however, in the way the two product areas considered here have been 
approached at the EU level. In the case of tobacco, despite the bias towards market building, EU 
legal and political processes have provided significant opportunities for pro-health supranational 
regulation. While minimum pricing of tobacco products has been prohibited, directives enforcing 
minimum standards of tobacco control across the EU have been enacted in a way that has not been 
accomplished for the field of alcohol policy.  In the case of alcohol, the Commission has relied heavily 
on  ‘soft law ? approaches, such as information sharing and voluntary agreements among civil society 
and business. Since the expiry of the EU alcohol strategy in 2012, there is no significant framework 
for tackling alcohol harms at the EU level. Alcohol policy has therefore been left more to the 
member state (and sub-state) level. Consequently, while in the area of tobacco control the European 
Court has played a role in the interpretation of EU-level law, in the realm of alcohol policy it has 
focussed on the compatibility of domestic laws with EU law. Thus, while in both policy areas the 
Court continues to play a crucial role in determining what measures are compatible with single-
market requirements and the free movement of goods, the potential for negative integration is 
much clearer in the case of alcohol than tobacco. While in the MUP alcohol case discussed here the 
Court seems to have taken a nuanced approach to the complex national and sub-national political 
context  ?ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐĂŶŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚ ?ŝĨŶŽƚĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ?ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚ
powers), there is currently no prospect of any meaningful health-related regulation of alcohol at the 
EU level. The different outcomes between the two policy areas thus reflect the different approaches 
to these products by the European Commission and member-state governments, whereby alcohol is 
seen to be less harmful than tobacco (and alcohol corporations are treated as partners capable of 
helping to reduce harm) (Hawkins et al., 2016). It demonstrates that EU law can be used to construct 
supranational public health regulations, but that whether or not this occurs depends on the political 
will of the Commission and of member states.  
The EU is consistent with more narrowly-drawn trade agreements and organisations in that the 
fundamental principles underlying EU law are premised upon market building. The single market is 
the cornerstone of the EU and the source of much of the jurisprudence of the Court. Many of the 
core principles of EU law, as well as the rights enjoyed by both corporate actors and EU citizens, are 
derived from Court rulings on different aspects of single-market law. While some of these decisions 
have been socially progressive, extending for example the right of movement for ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?
dependents across member states and equal pay for women (Stone Sweet, 2004), the centrality of 
the single market to the European integration project means that trade is the primary lens through 
which policy and law are viewed, and trade facilitation becomes the key objective to be pursued. Yet 
EU processes differ from those of purely trade-focussed agreements and organisations in their 
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implications for health. Other goals can be accommodated where they are able to demonstrate their 
compatibility with the overarching objective of EU trade liberalisation. Thus supranational regulation 
to protect health, including that which might offset the effects of negative market-building 
integration, is possible where sufficient political will exists among key policy actors.  
The comparison of EU legal proceedings with dispute-resolution processes in other international 
trade and investment forums is instructive. In the WTO, for example, only states have legal standing 
to initiate disputes, although corporations can and do lobby sympathetic governments to undertake 
such action on their behalf (Eckhardt et al., 2015). In many bilateral and regional trade and 
investment agreements, however, corporations can initiate disputes with governments directly 
through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) procedures (Hawkins and Holden, 2016), just as 
they can under EU law. In contrast to ISDS mechanisms, however, ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞŽĨ
direct effect does not only provide opportunities for corporations to utilise EU law, but also provides 
citizens with fundamental rights that can be pleaded before national courts under EU law.  
Further, the political roles of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament are crucial in 
producing EU-level law that, at its best, can construct a health-protective floor across all member 
states. This contrasts starkly with the WTO, which, despite the existence of health exceptions in its 
agreements, has failed to attach even the most basic common health or social standards, such as 
core labour standards, to those agreements (Peels and Fino, 2015)
5
.  ‘Dega-regional ? trade and 
investment agreements that have been the subject of recent negotiation, such as the Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), do include 
provisions for  ‘regulatory ĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ cooperation ?, which are similar in some 
respects to the formulation of common standards in the EU. However, these do not envisage the 
creation of political institutions akin to those of the EU, and have prompted concern that they may 
lead to a lowering, rather than simply a harmonisation, of standards (Holden and Hawkins, in press).  
 
Conclusion 
In answer to the three research questions posed at the beginning of this article, our analysis 
suggests, first, that EU law offers ample opportunities for corporations to challenge national health 
regulations; second, that there is significant scope for pro-health supranational regulation in the EU, 
but that such regulation must be couched in the language of facilitating the single market, and is 
                                                          
5
 Some bilateral and regional trade agreements do include provisions on minimum labour standards and on 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŽŚĞĂůƚŚ ?&ŽƌĂĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ŶĞǆƚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚƌĂĚĞ
agreements, see Holden and Hawkins (in press).  
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dependent on the political commitment of key policy actors; and, third, that this (limited) scope for 
pro-health supranational regulation distinguishes EU legal and political processes from those of most 
other trade agreements and organisations, which include exceptions for action at the national level 
to protect health, but which currently provide no opportunity to attach common minimum health 
standards to their trade provisions.  
In different ways, the legal cases reviewed here demonstrate the predominance of market principles 
within the European integration project, and its relevance for health policy at both the member 
state and EU levels. They demonstrate also the interconnection between legal judgements and the 
wider political agenda. Despite its market-ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ďŝĂƐ ? ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ŵƵĐŚ ŵŽƌĞdeveloped political 
institutions allow for greater health-protective legislation at the supranational level than more 
narrowly-drawn trade agreements and organisations. The importance of the political commitment of 
key policy actors is clear in this regard, where there is evidence of substantially greater political will 
to pursue regulation of tobacco products at the EU level when compared to the alcohol field, with 
EU regulation of tobacco exceeding national measures in some cases. However, even then this has 
had to be couched in the language of market facilitation. The alcohol case demonstrates both a lack 
of political ambition at the EU level to enact effective common measures to reduce harm, but also 
that national-level regulation is permissible if the proportionality test is met. However, the history of 
both tobacco and alcohol litigation suggests that certain types of regulation will be subject to 
particular scrutiny, with an underlying bias against minimum pricing of health-harming products 
evident.  
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